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ABSTRACT 
  
Participation in the budgetary process does not only comes with a positive effect(s) but 
could also lead to negative behavior(s) of employees, one of which is the creation of budgetary 
slack. Previous studies said that information asymmetry is rated as one of the causes of the 
creation of budgetary slack. The purposes of this 3x2 factorial experimental study and 
between subject designs are to see the effect of information asymmetry on the budgetary 
slack and see whether information asymmetry and self-efficacy leads to the creation of 
budgetary slack. This study involved 65 undergraduate and postgraduate students from the 
accounting department of Economics and Business Faculty in Universitas Airlangga Sura-
baya as participants. One way ANOVA and two- way ANOVA is used to test and analyze the 
proposed hypothesis. Results show that information asymmetry influences the creation of 
budgetary slack. However, production managers with high or low self-efficacy are still taking 
advantage of asymmetric information that happened to do budgetary slack. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the budgetary process, the purpose of the 
budget itself can be aligned to the interests of an 
individual or a team, and behavioral problems will 
show when the purpose is too hard, too easy (or 
unclear), or when the purpose caused conflicts of 
interest between a company and their employee. 
Thus, the participation in the budgetary process 
resulted in several negative issues, one of which is 
budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is the gap bet-
ween the total budget proposed by the subordinate 
and its best estimation [2]. Employees often have 
the tendency to do this when they were told to 
arrange the budget. Slack appears when subordi-
nate and supervisor do not share the same inte-
rests. [13] stated that subordinates intentionally 
created Slack for their personal interests, even 
more so when budgetary achievement is used as 
the main indicator of performance assessment. The 
subordinates used this condition in the budgetary 
process to their advantage by lowering the bud-
geted revenue and raising the budgeted expenses, 
which caused the gap between the total budget and 
the company‟s estimation. [4] stated in his research 
that participation in the budgetary process tends to 
lower the chance of budgetary slack. A different 
result is found in [14], which stated that there is a 
positive relation between budgetary participation 
and budgetary slack. 
The positive relation between budgetary par-
ticipation and budgetary slack occured when the 
subordinate is involved in budgetary participation 
and gives inaccurate information for their own 
personal interests. [17] said that the high participa-
tion rate in the budgetary process gives subordi-
nates a higher chance to do the budgetary slack. 
When the participation rate is low, it limits the 
chance to do budgetary slack and thus reduced 
Slack. Budgetary slack caused budget‟s credibility 
as a performance assessment tool is lowered be-
cause the allocated budget does not show the real 
capability of the managing subordinate. Budgetary 
slack will also affect next year‟s budgetary process. 
Information asymmetry was considered as the 
main cause of budgetary slack [12] [13]. [12] wrote, 
“Local information is an example of information 
asymmetry, which arises when the subordinate has 
information relevant to the decision process asso-
ciated with budgeting. Information asymmetry 
exists only when subordinates’ information exceeds 
that of their superiors”. In short, [12] stated that 
local information is an example of information 
asymmetry that arises when the subordinates‟ 
information on a unit of organization or subor-
dinates‟ responsibility center exceeds that of their 
superior. [2] stated that information asymmetry 
came from the agency theory, where the principal 
gives power to their agents to manage their com-
pany or organization. 
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The principal‟s limited information is used by 
the agent to do budgetary slack. Company‟s incen-
tive as a form of reward to their employees‟ per-
formance also spurred the subordinates to mini-
mize the budget, so that could reach their targeted 
budget easily and received more incentive. This 
statement is supported by [11] who stated that 
subordinate manager will make use of information 
asymmetry to do budgetary slack if there are any 
incentives in sight. 
Research on the influence of information 
asymmetry on budgetary slack has been done by 
some researchers. [23] in his/her research stated 
that information asymmetry has a negative influ-
ence on budgetary slack. [14] stated that informa-
tion asymmetry gives negative yet significant 
influence on budgetary slack, that is, it could 
reduce the budgetary slack. This happened because 
the subordinates helped by giving personal infor-
mation about future prospects, which produced a 
more accurate budget. In his/her thesis, [3] proved 
that information asymmetry has a positive influ-
ence toward budgetary slack. The differences in 
their research results may be caused by other 
factors that influence the relation between infor-
mation asymmetry and budgetary slack. 
In managing a company, employees held an 
important role in deciding whether the company‟s 
goal could be reached or not. Skill, attitude, and 
behavior of an employee became an important 
factor in decision making – one of them is on a 
budget, related to the continuity of a company. In 
his theory, [6] argued that human could think and 
manage their own behavior; so that they were not 
merely being a pawn, an object of environmental 
influence. Bandura developed self-efficacy theory, 
which had now become one of the psychological 
factors related to an individual‟s self, a self-recog-
nition factors that have influences on everyday life. 
This is because self-efficacy influenced individuals‟ 
acts in fulfilling their goals, including future events 
and individual‟s responses when facing a problem.  
Self-efficacy is an individual‟s faith in his/her 
own ability in doing their task or the action needed 
to reach certain goals [6]. Self-efficacy is also said 
as a result of the cognitive process in the form of 
decision, faith, or reward on how far an individual 
had estimated their ability in doing certain tasks or 
actions that were done in order to reach certain 
goals. Self-efficacy do not have any relation on how 
skillful an individual is, but on how sure that 
individual is on their own skill and how they have 
faith in their skills so that they could reach their 
goal and face uncertain situations. From the 
explanation above, it is evident that self-efficacy 
have an impact on an individual‟s actions. One of 
which is their performance.  
[28] described that the concept of self-efficacy 
has impacts on an employee in dealing workplace 
stresses. Employees with high self-efficacy have 
the tendency to use the focused approach on work 
stress problems, on the other hand, employees with 
low self-efficacy have the tendency to use emotional 
approach. 
Some relevant approaches were done with 
self-efficacy as the variable. One of them is [19], 
who tested the influence of self-efficacy on bud-
getary participation. He/she found that self-efficacy 
had a significant and positive influence on budge-
tary participation. [16] in his/her research also 
found that budgetary participation will become 
more effective in individuals with high self-efficacy. 
A high self-efficacy on an individual will shape 
them into an individual who refuses to give up and 
full of innovations in their effort to reach the goals 
that they have set. Individuals will always be 
ready to face conditions that they have never met 
previously and are prepared with solutions for 
those problems. Meanwhile, individuals with low 
self-efficacy have the tendency to be distraught, 
depressed, and give up easily when facing pro-
blems. This is because those individuals do not 
have faith in their own capability. 
Based on what was explained in the research 
backgrounds, there are two questions: 1) Do infor-
mation asymmetry influence budgetary slack? 2) 
What are the influences of information asymmetry 
and self-efficacy on budgetary slack?  
 
MINDMAP 
 
 
Picture 1. Mind Map 
 
Hypothesis Development  
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Budgetary Slack 
Budgetary participation has its own advan-
tages and disadvantages. One of its advantages is 
that it could increase the performance of an organi-
zation. However, aside from increasing the perfor-
mance, budgetary participation could also cause 
dysfunctional behaviors, such as budgetary slack 
done by an individual [26]. [12] stated that subor-
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dinate‟s budgetary participation gives their supe-
rior a chance to get access to local information, 
which enables the subordinate to show their perfor-
mance that will be assessed. In reality, however, 
subordinates hid or held back some information 
that they have, thus creating budgetary slack. 
Higher asymmetry information means a 
higher chance of budgetary slack happening. This 
is because the superior did not have information 
regarding their subordinate‟s performance so that 
the subordinates could easily manipulate the best 
real estimation. Subordinates will take advantage 
of their superior‟s ignorance of their real perfor-
mance to create slack so that their goal could be 
reached and they would receive more incentives 
from their superior for their performance. 
Some researchers focused on information 
asymmetry and budgetary slack, one example is 
[5]. Their result shows that when subordinates 
honestly tell their private information in the bud-
getary process, the company‟s budget efficiency will 
rise. [9] on their research stated that information 
asymmetry has a substantial impact on budgetary 
slack, as well as increasing it. Budgetary partici-
pation is the cause of slack, especially when there 
is also a high information asymmetry. [21] found 
that if some variables such as reputation, ethics, 
and self-esteem are in a high condition, it positively 
affects behavior that causes budgetary slack on 
subordinates under high information asymmetry.  
A superior‟s lack of information is being taken 
advantage of by their subordinates to find bias 
information by doing budgetary slack. Slack itself 
is done by reporting an budget that is lower than 
what the subordinate is capable of. [24] explained 
that in budgetary participation, subordinate could 
hide some of their information, which then caused 
budgetary slack. From the explanations above, the 
researcher proposed the following research hypo-
thesis: 
H1:  Information Asymmetry positively influences 
budgetary slack. 
 
The Influence of Relation between Informa-
tion Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy towards 
Budgetary Slack. 
Self-efficacy is an individual‟s faith in their 
own ability in doing tasks or actions needed to 
reach certain goals [6]. Self-efficacy is also stated as 
a result of the cognitive process in the form of 
decision, faith, or reward on how far an individual 
had estimated their ability in doing a task or 
certain actions that were done in order to reach 
certain goals. Self-efficacy does not have any 
relation with how skillful an individual is, but on 
how sure that individual is with their own skills. 
Bandura mentioned that self-efficacy is different 
from aspiration because aspiration is about some-
thing ideal while self-efficacy is about self-assess-
ment.  
[28] described that the concept of self-efficacy 
has impacts on an employee in dealing workplace 
stresses. Employees with high self-efficacy have 
the tendency to use the focused approach on work 
stress problems, on the other hand, employees with 
low self-efficacy have the tendency to use emotional 
approach. [25] said individuals with high self-
efficacy would do their task by considering the 
consequences of errors. On the other hand, indivi-
duals with low self-efficacy would feel pressure or 
stress from their work. Individuals with high self-
efficacy considered challenges as an opportunity to 
display their skills [6]. 
[19] explained that self-efficacy has a signi-
ficant and positive influence on budgetary partici-
pation. [16] also stated something similar in his 
research, that individual with self-efficacy would 
raise the effectiveness of budgetary participation. 
As [20] said, that budgetary participation influ-
enced budgetary gap, then self-efficacy influenced 
budgetary slack through employee‟s participation 
in the budgetary process. 
As explained in H1 about the influence of 
information asymmetry on budgetary slack in the 
context of budgetary participation, employees with 
high self-efficacy are expected to be able to reduce 
slack, because the individuals think that they are 
capable of accomplishing the allocated budget. 
Aside from that, employees with high self-efficacy 
are also expected to achieve their real performance 
without doing slack. Based on the previous expla-
nations, the researcher proposed the following 
research hypothesis: 
H2:  Individuals with high self-efficacy do not need 
to do budgetary slack by taking advantage of 
information asymmetry in doing their work. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
 
Research design explains all the needed pro-
cesses in planning and executing the research. This 
research is an experimental research with 3x2 
factorial and between subject design that was 
conducted to see the influence of information asym-
metry and self-efficacy on budgetary slack, which 
was done by using Completely Randomized Design 
(CRD). Information asymmetry‟s variables are 
grouped into two conditions, high and low self-
efficacy. 
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Table 1. Factorial Design – Influence of Information 
Asymmetry and Self-efficacy on Budgetary Slack 
 Without 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Medium 
Information 
Asymmetry 
High 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Low Self-
efficacy  
Case 1 Case 3 Case 5 
High Self-
efficacy 
Case 2 Case 4 Case 6 
 
Case Experiment 
In this case experiment, the participant is 
seen as a low-level manager, a production manager 
of a plane construction company named PT 
Pesawat Kokoh, and the researcher is their supe-
rior. The participant is asked to do three produc-
tion tasks by creating paper planes, each in two 
minutes. The production task 1 is considered as the 
production manager‟s past skills, the production 
task 2 is done to measure their expected perfor-
mance. As written in [27], expected performance is 
the potential ability of a production‟s employee that 
could not be observed by their superior. Thus, 
expected performance is proxied from the average 
of production 1 and 2. And production task 3 is 
done to see the real ability of the production mana-
ger. 
Production manager will get incentives added 
to their basic salary as a bonus, if they could exceed 
the production target, and will still be given their 
basic salary even if they do not exceed them. 
Production managers would then be grouped 
into three different information asymmetry. On the 
„without information asymmetry‟ group, production 
managers are asked to submit all production 
results, „low information asymmetry‟ group is only 
asked for production task 1 result, and „high infor-
mation asymmetry‟ group, the production manager 
is not asked to submit any production result. 
After a production manager knows their per-
formance, the given incentive, and the received 
information asymmetry condition, the manager is 
then asked to proposed production target to their 
superior. Production target proposition is a form of 
budgetary participation that is needed by respon-
sibility center to support plane construction activi-
ties. 
 
Experiment Procedure 
1. Distributing research questionnaires to partici-
pants based on their information asymmetry 
case.  
 Distributing behavior questionnaire, self-effica-
cy questionnaire, and papers to do a production 
task. The questionnaire distribution is random-
ly done, so participants have the same proba-
bility to get a condition without information 
asymmetry, low information asymmetry, or 
high information asymmetry 
2. Research explanation. 
 Explaining the goal and purpose of the research 
and steps in doing the research. The researcher 
will give answers to questions if there are any 
unclear explanation. 
3. Filling the provided demographic data. 
 Participants are asked to fill their demographic 
data such as name, gender, age, major, GPA, 
and check the box if they have passed Mana-
gement Accounting, and/or Financial and Bud-
get Analysis (FBA) courses. 
4. Doing production task 1. 
 Participants are asked to do production task 1 
with the previously distributed papers in two 
minutes and fill in the production task result. 
Participants are not allowed to start before the 
instruction is given. 
5. Doing production task 2. 
 Participants are asked to do production task 2 
with the previously distributed papers in two 
minutes and fill in the production task result. 
Participants are not allowed to start before the 
instruction is given. 
6. Doing production task 3. 
 Participants are asked to do production task 3 
with the previously distributed papers in two 
minutes and fill in the production task result. 
Participants are not allowed to start before the 
instruction is given. 
7. Treatment on each information asymmetry 
groups. 
 After finishing production task 1, 2, and 3, par-
ticipants are then asked to read and under-
stand the asymmetry group they belong to. 
8. Deciding the target in finishing the next pro-
duction task. 
 After participants understand the information 
asymmetry treatment groups from the ques-
tionnaire, they are asked to decide the produc-
tion target. 
9. Fill out the manipulation check 
 Manipulation check aims to find out the partici-
pants‟ understanding of the case that they have 
received. 
10. Fill out the self-efficacy questionnaire 
 After filling out the manipulation check, parti-
cipants are then asked to fill out the self-efficacy 
questionnaire. 
 
Operational Definition and Variable Mea-
surement 
Operational definition is a definition that is 
given to variables by giving them meaning, acti-
vities specification, and certain operational to 
measure the variables [1]. In this research, three 
variables are used: two independent variables and 
one dependent variable. 
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Independent Variable 
Independent variable is variable that influ-
ence or causes changes to dependent variables. 
Independent variable is also known as treatment 
variable, cause, risk, stimulus variable, antecedent, 
influence variable, treatment, and independent 
variable. In this research, the researcher used inde-
pendent variables, information asymmetry, and 
self-efficacy. 
Information asymmetry is a condition where 
superior, as principal, does not always know the 
activities of low-level manager (production mana-
ger), as the agent, and the actual condition that 
took place in the unit that the agent was respon-
sible for. This condition creates private information 
for the superior on the proposed budget. The 
budgetary proposal is reflected through the agent‟s 
production capability. 
To distinguish the influence information 
asymmetry toward budgetary slack, the researcher 
split information asymmetry unto three groups 
that are measured with a nominal scale: 
a. Without information asymmetry 
 A condition where the production manager 
reported all of his/her production task result to 
the superior so that the superior could accura-
tely evaluate the low-level manager‟s perfor-
mance. This condition denied the low-level 
manager the chance to show any kinds of 
underperformance. This group is identified with 
numeral 1.  
b. Low information asymmetry 
 A condition where production manager only 
reported production task 1 to the superior. This 
condition caused superior to not fully under-
stand the performance of a low-level manager, 
especially on production task 2 and 3. Thus, the 
superior could not accurately evaluate the low-
level manager‟s performance. This created a 
small chance for the production manager to set 
the production target to be lower than their real 
capability. This group is identified with nume-
ral 2. 
c. High information asymmetry 
 A condition where the production manager was 
not asked to report all production task result to 
their superior. This caused superior to know 
nothing of the low-level manager‟s performance 
so that the later had the chance to set the target 
below his/her real capability. The superior thus 
did not have a chance to evaluate the produc-
tion target proposed by their subordinate. This 
group is identified with numeral 3. 
 
In this research, all information asymmetry 
treatment group is given information on the incen-
tive scheme as a payment method that will be 
received by production manager after doing the 
production task. The incentive calculation method 
used in this research is Fixed Pay Plus-Bonus, the 
same method that was used by [3] [21] [27]. The 
equation of the method is as written below: 
P = A + {a x (Y’- Y”)}, if Y’> Y” P = A, if Y’ < Y” 
Notes: 
P = Low level manager total compensation/pay-
ment 
A  =  Fixed pay received by low-level manager 
a  =  Bonus for each unit 
Y‟  =  Actual produced output/production 
Y”  =  Production target that is proposed by low-
level manager 
 
Self-efficacy is an individual‟s faith in his/her 
own ability in doing their task or the action needed 
to reach certain goals [6]. Self-efficacy do not have 
any relation on how skillful an individual is, but on 
how sure that individual is on their own skill. 
To measure self-efficacy variable, the rese-
archer used an instrument that was developed by 
[7] in Indonesian Adaptation of the General Self-
Efficacy Scale (GSE). This instrument consists of 
10 question items, which will then be measured by 
using Likert scale 1-5. 
In this research, self-efficacy is split into two 
groups, high and low self-efficacy. The median of 
the variables is used as a cut off to determine 
which participants were in the high and low self-
efficacy group. Participants with a total value 
below the median will be given number 2 as their 
identity. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Dependent variables are variables that receiv-
ed influence from independent variables. They 
called it the dependent variable because dependent 
variables are influenced by independent variables. 
In this research, budgetary slack is considered as 
the dependent variable. Budgetary slack is the gap 
between the total budget proposed by the 
subordinate and its best estimation [2]. Similar to 
the research done by [3] [27], this research also 
used the following equation: 
 
                     
  
                                     
                    
 
 
Expected performance is the subordinate‟s 
production potential that was proxied by finding 
the mean of production result 1 and 2, as written 
below: 
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RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Description of the Research Subject 
 
This study involved college students from the 
Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas 
Airlangga Surabaya. The participants were under-
graduate and postgraduate students from account-
ing major from the 2011 to 2015 batch, who have 
already passed Management Accounting and/or 
Financial and Budget Analysis (FBA) courses. In 
this experimental study, participants were seen as 
production manager of a plane construction com-
pany and the researcher acted as their superior. 
There are 65 participants, with 22 in high 
information asymmetry group, 21 low information 
asymmetry, and another 22 grouped together in 
the without information asymmetry group. 
 
Validity Test 
The validity of the self-efficacy questionnaire 
is tested with Pearson Correlation test. This test 
used 0,05 significance with the two-tailed test, to 
get r count that was tested on 30 questionnaire 
data. 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Test 
Question Items Correlation Value R Table Status 
SE1 0,454 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE2 0,389 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE3 0,409 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE4 0,556 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE5 0,541 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE6 0,621 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE7 0,645 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE8 0,650 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE9 0,714 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
SE10 0,419 ≥ 0,3 Valid 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
Based on table 2, the value of r count is higher 
than r table (≥0,3), so it could be declared that the 
10 question items in the self-efficacy questionnaire 
are valid. 
After the validity test, there is a reliability test 
to verify the reliability of self-efficacy question-
naire. In this test, Cronbach‟s Alpha test is used.  
Questionnaire instrument will be considered as 
reliable when their Cronbach Alpha value is higher 
than r table. This test used 0,05 significance with a 
two-tailed test on 30 data (n). 
 
Table 3. Self-Efficacy Reliability Test 
Variable Cronbach’s Alpha Status 
Self-Efficacy 0,842 Reliable 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
The test result shows Cronbach‟s Alpha value 
of 0,842, which is higher than 0,6 (> 0,6). Thus, the 
question items in the questionnaire are declared as 
reliable. 
 
Homogeneity Test 
 
Table 4. The Result of Chi-Square Gender Test Based on 
Information Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy 
a. 6 cells (50 %) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2,91  
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
  
Table 4 shows value of 1,174 with signification 
value of 0,947 which is higher than 0,05 (0,947 > 
0,05). Thus, it could be summarized that there is no 
difference between gender with information asym-
metry treatment group and the participant‟s self-
efficacy. In other words, the two data samples 
above are of the homogenous variant. 
  
Hypothesis Test Results 
The hypothesis test on this research used one 
way ANOVA and two-way ANOVA tests. 
The hypotheses of this research are (1) Infor-
mation asymmetry positively influence budgetary 
slack, and (2) Individuals with high self-efficacy do 
not need to do budgetary slack by taking advan-
tage of information asymmetry in doing their work.  
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Budgetary Slack 
 
a. Hypothesis Test 
To test the influence of information asym-
metry on budgetary slack, the researcher used one 
way ANOVA test. The hypothesis is accepted if F 
count > F table or p-value is more than 0,05. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistic of Budgetary Slack‟s One 
Way ANOVA Test Based on Information Asymmetry 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Groups 
 
N 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
High 22 0,3173 0,21126 0,4504 0 0,83 
Low 21 0,3423 0,23929 0,5222 0 0,89 
Without 22 0,1275 0,37382 0,7970 0 1,67 
Total 65 0,2611 0,29627 0,3675 0 1,67 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
The descriptive statistic above shows that the 
mean of budgetary slack in a high information 
asymmetry is 0,3173 with standard deviation and 
standard error of 0,21126 and 0,4504 each. The 
minimum value of budgetary slack done in a high 
information asymmetry is 0 and the maximum 
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value is 0,83. In low information asymmetry, the 
mean is 0,3423 with standard deviation and stan-
dard error of 0,23929 and 0,52222 each. Minimum 
budgetary slack in low information asymmetry is 0 
and the maximum value is 0,89. In without infor-
mation asymmetry condition, the average number 
of budgetary slack done by production manager is 
0,1275 with standard deviation and standard error 
of 0,29627 and 0,03675 each. The minimum value 
of budgetary slack done in this condition is 0 and 
its maximum is 1,67. 
In this test, a test of homogeneity is also 
included. To test this, the researcher used Levene‟s 
Test, where the data variants are considered as 
homogeneous if their test result shows p-value > α 
(0,05). 
 
Table 6. Variants‟ Homogeneity Test 
Variance Levene‟s 
Statistic 
Sig. Status 
Budgetary slack based 
on Information 
Asymmetry 
0,366 0,695 Homogenous 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
The result in table 6 shows that the Levene's 
statistic value of 0,695, which is higher than 0,05. 
Thus, the budgetary slack data based on informa-
tion asymmetry is declared as homogenous. 
Next, the calculation to get F count was done. 
If p-value > 0,05, it can be concluded that there is 
no difference between treatment groups. On the 
other hand, if p-value < 0,05, there are at least a 
pair of groups that received different treatment. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistic of Budgetary Slack Based 
on Information Asymmetry Treatment Group 
 Sum of 
Square 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 0,601 2 0,300 3.711 0,030 
Within Groups 5,017 62 0,081   
Total 5,618 64    
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
From table 7, it is known that the p-value is 
0,030, which is lower than α = 0,05 (0,030 < 0,05). 
This shows that there is at least one pair of 
treatment group that is different. From here, it can 
be concluded that the average value of budgetary 
slack between information asymmetry treatment 
groups is significantly different, which means infor-
mation asymmetry positively influence budgetary 
slack. H1 is thus accepted. 
From the ANOVA test result, it is known that 
information asymmetry has an influence on the 
budgetary slack. The highest average of budgetary 
slack done by production manager is 0,3423, which 
happened when the company is in a state of low 
information asymmetry. 
To see which groups are different, there is a 
need to do further examination by using post hoc 
test [15]. 
 
Table 8. Post Hoc Test of Information Asymmetry Treat-
ment Groups 
(I) Information 
Asymmetry 
Groups 
(J) Information 
Asymmetry 
Groups 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(I–J) 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
Sig. 
High Low -0,02504 0,8678 0,774 
Without 0,18978* 0,8577 0,031 
Low High 0,02594 0,8678 0,774 
Without 0,2482* 0,8678 0,016 
Without High -0,18978* 0,8577 0,031 
Low -0,21482* 0,8678 0,016 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
From table 8, it is known that the test that 
compared high information asymmetry and low 
information asymmetry groups resulted in p-value 
= 0,031< α = 0,05, which make it known that there 
is a difference of budgetary score average between 
high information asymmetry and low information 
asymmetry treatment groups. A comparison test 
between low information asymmetry and without 
information asymmetry resulted in p-value = 0,016 
< α = 0,05, on which the conclusion is that there is 
a difference in budgetary slack score average bet-
ween the two groups. 
The highest average score differences of 
without information asymmetry and low infor-
mation asymmetry treatment groups budgetary 
slack is 0,21482. This shows that there is still a 
tendency for a production manager to do budgetary 
slack even in a condition where there is no 
information asymmetry. 
 
b. Coefficient of Determination (  ) 
Coefficient of determination is used to explain 
the dependent variable‟s variation proportion or 
percentage that was being explained together by 
independent variables. 
The H1 test is used to see whether informa-
tion asymmetry has an influence on the creation of 
budgetary slack. H1 test method resulted in an 
adjusted value of 5,6% 
 
Table 9. Coefficient of Determination (  ) Test 
Model R R square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0,266 (a) 0,71 0,56 0,28789 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Information Asymmetry. 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
The low percentage of coefficient of determina-
tion shows that there are other factors that affect 
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budgetary slack, aside from information asym-
metry, that is not being researched on this experi-
ment. 
 
The Influence of Relation between Informa-
tion Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy on Budge-
tary Slack 
 
a. Hypothesis Test 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of Budgetary Slack 
Based on Information Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Self-
Efficacy 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Without 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Low 0,2749 0,21308 11 
High 0,3596 0,21066 11 
Total 0,3173 0,21126 22 
Low Information 
Asymmetry 
Low 0,4106 0,25534 14 
High  0,2058 0,13027 7 
Total 0,3423 0,23929 21 
High 
Information 
asymmetry 
Low 0,2381 0,62994 7 
High  0,0759 0,17484 15 
Total 0,1275 0,37382 22 
Total Low 0,3262 0,35312 32 
High  0,1980 0,21542 33 
Total 0,2611 0,29627 65 
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
 
ANOVA two-way test measures the main 
effect and interaction effect of independent varia-
bles toward dependent variables. The hypothesis 
will be accepted if F count ≥ F table or p-value less 
than 0,05, and will be rejected if F count ≤ F table 
or p-value more than 0,05. 
Table 10 shows the average values of bud-
getary slack that was done by production mana-
gers with high and low self-efficacy, which would 
later be tested on whether it has a significant 
influence on information asymmetry and self-effi-
cacy or not. The result of the test is as table 11. 
Based on the data in table 11, the hypothesis 
between information asymmetry group shows p-
value = 0,143 > α = 0,05. Thus, it could be 
concluded that there are no differences in the 
information asymmetry group. Hypothesis bet-
ween self-efficacy group shows p-value = 0,202 > α 
= 0,05, so there is also no differences on self-efficacy 
group. Hypothesis on the interaction between 
information asymmetry and self-efficacy shows p-
value = 0,209 < α = 0,05, so it could be concluded 
that there is no interaction between information 
asymmetry and self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis on the interaction between infor-
mation asymmetry and self-efficacy (Information 
Asymmetry*Self-efficacy) shows p-value of 0,209, 
which is higher than 0,05 (0,209 > 0,05). This fact 
shows that there is no interaction between infor-
mation asymmetry and self-efficacy. The conclu-
sion from two-way ANOVA testing is that the 
statement that says individuals with high self-
efficacy do not need to do budgetary slack by taking 
advantage of information asymmetry condition in 
doing their work is rejected. Because all hypotheses 
tests are being rejected, there is no need to do a 
post hoc test. 
 
RESEARCH RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
Influence of Information Asymmetry on Bud-
getary Slack 
 
The H1 test result shows a p-value of 0,030 
which is lower than α = 0,05, thus it could be 
asserted that there is a difference in the average 
value of budgetary slack. The test result proved 
that information asymmetry is one of the triggers 
of budgetary slack, it means that  H1 is accepted. 
The post hoc test result shows that the with-
out information asymmetry and low information 
asymmetry group have the highest gap on the 
budgetary slack average: 0,21482. 
As mentioned previously, the highest budge-
tary slack average that is done by the production 
manager happened in low information asymmetry 
condition with a value of 0,3423 and did not 
happen in high information asymmetry condition. 
This fact shows that even in the condition where 
Table 11. Between-Subjects Effects Budgetary Slack Based on Information Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy Test Result 
Dependent Variable: Budgetary Slack 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Status 
Corrected Model 0,961a 5 0,192 2,436 0,045  
Intercept  4,043 1 4,043 51,234 0,000  
Information Asymmetry 0,317 2 0,159 2,011 0,143  
Self-Efficacy 0,132 1 0,132 1,668 0,202  
Information Asymmetry*Self-Efficacy 0,254 2 0,127 1,608 0,209 H2 is rejected 
Error  4,656 59 0,079    
Total 10,050 65     
Corrected Total 5,618 64     
Source: Processed primary data, 2016 
JURNAL AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN, VOL. 20, NO. 2, NOVEMBER 2018: 62-72 
 
70 
superiors have a chance to know something or 
nothing about production manager‟s performance, 
they would still do budgetary slack. 
Subordinate‟s involvement in the budgetary 
process is thought to be able to increase perfor-
mance, unfortunately, however, their budgetary 
participation could cause the dysfunctional beha-
vior to appear on individuals, for example creating 
budgetary slack [26]. [12] stated that the higher 
the participation rate, the higher their chance to 
directly contributing on budgetary slack. 
Slack would appear when subordinates and 
superiors‟ goals are different [18]. Because there 
are differences in higher and lower manager‟s 
goals, the lower manager gives wrong information 
to their superior [2]. Subordinates deliberately 
creating slack because of personal interests, even 
more so if performance assessment is measured 
from budgetary achievement [10]. By giving under-
estimated budget goals, coupled with incomplete 
performance information, will make the superior 
create production target which is below the real 
performance of the subordinates. Because of that, 
the subordinates have no need to work hard to 
reach the target. Achievements will also be easier 
to reach. This has been proven in this research by 
giving incentives to production manager, which 
would then make them feel the need to do 
budgetary slack, even in a company where the 
principal could evaluate all production results and 
production manager‟s performances. 
The result of this research is the same with 
[27], in which he found that information asym-
metry influenced budgetary slack. [9] also agreed 
with the result by saying that information asym-
metry‟s influence on budgetary slack is substantial 
and causes an increase of budgetary slack. Thus, it 
can be concluded that information asymmetry is a 
factor that contributes to budgetary slack‟s crea-
tion. 
[23], however, found that information asym-
metry negatively influences the relation between 
budgetary participation with budgetary slack. [14] 
in their research also stated that information 
asymmetry negatively, yet significantly, influence 
budgetary slack, that is, it could reduce budgetary 
slack. This happened because subordinates could 
be helping the company by giving private 
information on a future prospect so that the budget 
could be processed more accurately. 
 
The Influence of Relation between Informa-
tion Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy on Bud-
getary Slack 
 
H2 test result stated that individuals with 
high self-efficacy do not have the need to do bud-
getary slack by taking advantage of information 
asymmetry, or with the assumption on production 
manager with high self-efficacy, the influence of 
information asymmetry towards budgetary slack 
will be lower than production manager with low 
self-efficacy. However, the two way ANOVA test on 
H2 shows that that interaction between asymme-
try and self-efficacy (Information Asymmetry*Self-
Efficacy) on budgetary slack has a p-value of 0,209 
which is higher than 0,05 (0,209 > 0,05).   
From the calculation test, it can be concluded 
that there is no interaction between self-efficacy 
and information asymmetry with budgetary slack. 
Thus, the statement that says high self-efficacy 
individuals do not need to do budgetary slack by 
taking advantage of information asymmetry in 
doing their task is rejected (H2 is rejected). 
Self-efficacy is an individual‟s faith in his/her 
own ability in doing their task or the action needed 
to reach certain goals. Self-efficacy is also said as a 
result of the cognitive process in the form of 
decision, faith, or reward on how far an individual 
had estimated their ability in doing a task or 
certain actions that were done in order to reach 
certain goals [6]. [25] said individuals with high 
self-efficacy would do their task by considering the 
consequences of errors. On the other hand, indi-
viduals with low self-efficacy would feel pressure or 
stress from their work. Individuals with high self-
efficacy considered challenges as an opportunity to 
display their skills [6]. These statements caused 
the proposed H2 to be pulled back. Production 
manager with high self-efficacy in all their task will 
consider the production target as a chance to show 
their skills, and they will work hard to meet the 
target, even if there is a chance to do budgetary 
slack because of the information asymmetry. 
Research results that also studied self-efficacy 
were done by [16] and [19]. They found that self-
efficacy influence, significantly and positively, on 
budgetary participation. Both researchers argued 
that participation will be more effective for indi-
viduals with high self-efficacy. As stated by [12], 
the higher the participation of subordinates in the 
budgetary process, the higher their chance to 
directly contribute to the creation of budgetary 
slack. Information asymmetry‟s interaction is also 
found as the cause of budgetary slack [12] [13]. 
Information asymmetry that is supported by 
the superior‟s full ignorance on performance, is 
being taken advantage of by production manager 
to manipulate their ability so that they could reach 
the target and got praises from their superior for 
the achievement of „conquering‟ the production 
target.  
This possibility is caused by incentives by the 
principal. As [6] theory said, incentives as rewards 
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from others as the form of appreciation to their 
success in doing some task(s) could affect an 
individual‟s self-efficacy. [11] also said that lower 
manager will take advantage of information asym-
metry to do budgetary slack if the incentive is 
given. As a result, the received incentive would 
then lead to budgetary slack. Because of the 
incentive, production manager will always stay in 
their comfort zone to take advantage of low infor-
mation asymmetry condition in the company to do 
budgetary slack for their work achievement and 
receive appreciation for „conquering‟ all tasks and 
work challenge. The incentive could also raise the 
chance of doing budgetary slack for production 
managers with low self-efficacy. 
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the series of tests done in this research, 
it can be concluded that (1) information asymmetry 
leads to budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is still 
done by production manager in any information 
asymmetry condition. This may be caused by 
incentives. In order to reach the goal set by their 
superior more easily, production manager delibera-
tely manipulates their performance. Thus, when 
the superior decided the company‟s production 
target, no less than manipulation target and no 
more than the production manager‟s actual per-
formance that is not known by the superior. As a 
result, the target will be easier to achieve, and 
huge incentives will be received by the production 
manager. (2) Individuals with high or low self-
efficacy will take advantage of the information 
asymmetry condition in a company to do budgetary 
slack. 
 
Limitations 
  
Even after going through research procedures, 
this experiment still faced some obstacles, such as 
1) there are participants that did not pass the 
manipulation check, though few in number, pos-
sibly because they are not reading carefully enough 
as there are too many questionnaire papers; 2) 
college students that did not have any prior 
experience in budgetary participation were the 
participants of the research sample, enabling the 
chance appearance of bias on the research results, 
which then became unable to be generalized; 3) 
This research did not study other variables that 
could affect or create budgetary slack, 4) not all 
experiments were done in a class, because it 
clashed with semester breaks, which caused only 
42 out of 65 participants did the experiments inside 
the class, while the rest is done separately, thus 
prolonging the time to gather experimental data. 
 
Feedback 
 
Based on the research results and conclusion, 
there are several feedbacks: 1) make the wording 
in the questionnaire shorter and clearer, while also 
ask the participants to give their full attention 
when they fill out the questionnaire, 2) future 
researcher(s) could change participants with sam-
ples that have already been involved in actual 
budgetary process or have worked in a company, 3) 
future researcher(s) could choose other variables 
such as performance, work motivation, ethics, locus 
of control, or any other to see their influence on 
budgetary slack, 4) if future researcher(s) still want 
to use college students as research samples, experi-
ments should be done while the semester is still on 
so that the experiment could be done in a class-
room with a large number of samples and the data 
could be gathered a lot more quickly. 
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